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What is an Ontology?
Fabian Neuhaus
Abstract
In the knowledge engineering community “ontology” is usually de-
fined in the tradition of Gruber as an “explicit specification of a conceptu-
alization”. Several variations of this definition exist. In the paper we argue
that (with one notable exception) these definitions are of no explanatory
value, because they violate one of the basic rules for good definitions: The
defining statement (the definiens) should be clearer than the term that is
defined (the definiendum). In the paper we propose a different definition
of “ontology” and discuss how it helps to explain various phenomena: the
ability of ontologies to change, the role of the choice of vocabulary, the
significance of annotations, the possibility of collaborative ontology de-
velopment, and the relationship between ontological conceptualism and
ontological realism.
1 Introduction
In 1992 Tom Gruber proposed the following definition “An ontology is a spec-
ification of a conceptualization” [4]. Several variants exist that usually add
adjectives further describing the specification (e.g., “formal”, “explicit”) or the
conceptualization (e.g., “shared”) (see discussion of related work in Section 5).
These definitions are not helpful because they violate one of the basic rules
for good definitions: the defining statement (the definiens) should be clearer
than the term that is defined (the definiendum). As long as “conceptualiza-
tion” is murkier than “ontology”, any attempt of defining “ontology” as a kind
of “specification of a conceptualization” is an intellectual placebo: it makes
us feel like it provides a better grasp of the nature of ontologies, but there is
no intellectual progress, because it lacks explanatory value (see Section 2 for
details).
Given the difficulties in defining “ontology” one may come to the conclu-
sion that a proper definition is not really needed. This seems to be the sentiment
of Gruber in [7], who writes after discussing an objection to his original defi-
nition:
Taking a more pragmatic view, one can say that ontology is a tool
and product of engineering and thereby defined by its use.
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However, it would be rather embarrassing for applied ontologists to give up
that easily. After all, we are supposed to be the experts on defining terms.
Thus, we should be able to provide a satisfactory definition of our own subject.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a novel definition of “ontology” which
may be stated informally as:
Informal Definition 1 An ontology of a given domain of interest is a document
that provides
1. a vocabulary for describing the domain of interest,
2. annotations that documents the vocabulary, and
3. a logical theory (consisting of axioms and definitions) for the vocabulary,
in a way that these three elements together enable a competent user of the
ontology to ascertain its intended interpretation.
Before this proposal is presented in detail and is formalized in Section 4,
we first discuss some of the phenomena, which should be illuminated by a defi-
nition of “ontology” (see Section 3). Central to our account of ontologies is the
role of annotations, which often not only grounds the ‘meaning’ of the vocab-
ulary, but frequently provides much more information than is captured by the
logical theory. One major benefit of our account is that it explains the relation-
ship between versions of an ontology in different languages (e.g., BFO in FOL
and OWL). It further enables us to clearly analyze certain errors in ontologies,
e.g., a mismatch between the annotations and the logical theory of an ontol-
ogy. The proposed definition has the additional benefit of being compatible
with both conceptualism and a realistic reading of ontologies. Indeed, one can
prove that given a correct conceptualization of a domain, any correct ontology
of the conceptualization, is a correct ontology of the domain (Section 4.5).
2 Barren and Fertile Definitions
We are free to define terms in any way we want, but some definitions are better
than others. To illustrate the point lets consider two different definitions of
“inch”.
Example 1
E.1a An inch is the length of three barley corns.
E.1b An inch is the length of the path travelled by light in a vacuum within
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seconds.
Example E1.a is based on a statute by Edward II of England in the 14th cen-
tury. Example E1.b approximates the contemporary definition, according to
which an inch is 2.54 cm and a meter is defined in terms of the speed of light.
Which of these definitions is better? The answer seems obvious, because E1.b
provides a better measurement resolution, since E1.a does not allow measuring
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length differences below the size of a barley corn. In addition, E1.b enables
better measurement precision, since it avoids measurement uncertainty due to
variation in barley corn size.
However, imagine some visionary natural philosopher would have pro-
posed to Edward II to use E1.b instead of E1.a. Since Aristotle discussed the
existence of a vacuum and the question of the speed of light1, these concepts
would be familiar to scholars of the time. E.g., in the 13th century Witelo
considered the possibility that light is faster when traveling through a vacuum
than when traveling through a thicker medium [14]. Thus, assuming some
Arab mathematician would have helped with the Arabic numerals and frac-
tions, E1.b would not have been outside the conceptual realm of contempo-
raries of Edward II. But should Edward II have chosen E1.b instead of E1.a?
Within an agricultural medieval society nobody possessed precise clocks,
let alone the technology to determine how far light travels in a given fraction
of a second. Thus, the contemporaries of King Edward II would not have been
able to apply E1.b and use it to determine the length of an object. Therefore, if
Edward II would have embraced E1.b, this decision would have had no impact
on the actual use of the term “inch”. Since the inch was already established
as a measurement unit, people would have continued to use “inch” in the way
they always understood it, while paying lip-service to the definition. Hence,
the royal definition would not have contributed to a standardization of length
measurements. In contrast, E1.a provided a definition of “inch” that was easily
accessible and usable for people in an agricultural society.
This example illustrates that the fertility of a definition depends on the con-
text of its use. Fertility denotes the degree to which people who embrace a
definition are able to utilize it, e.g., to classify some phenomenon or solve a
problem or to make some other tangible intellectual process. In the context
of the 21st century E1.b is more fertile than E1.a, because it enables better
measurements of lengths and connects it systematically to other units of mea-
surement in the International System of Units. However, in the context of a
medieval society E1.b would serve no useful function at all; it would be bar-
ren. This is the case, because King Edward’s contemporaries already had a
better understanding of “inch” (the definiendum) than of the definiens of E1.b.
Most definitions of “ontology” are as barren as E1.b would have been for
King Edward II, and for the same reasons. It is quite easy to introduce the
term “ontology” to a novice to the field by illustrating it with examples and use
cases. Such an introduction leads to an operational understanding of the term
“ontology”, which allows the novice to recognize typical examples of ontolo-
gies and to recognize typical situations where ontologies may be used to solve a
problem. (Analogously to the members of King Edward’s II court, who had an
operational understanding of “inch”.) Thus, any definition of “ontology” may
only be fertile, if our understanding of the definiens exceeds this kind of oper-
ational level of understanding of “ontology”. However, the terms “concepts”
1[1] Physics IV.213a11-217b28, On the Soul II.418b21-418b26.
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and “conceptualization” are notoriously hard to explain. Indeed, the nature of
concepts is an open question in philosophy [13, 19]. This is reflected by the
diverse explanations of “conceptualization” in the applied ontology literature,
which include:
1. “the objects, concepts, and other entities that are assumed to exist in
some area of interest and the relationships that hold among them” [6]
2. “[...] abstract, simplified view of the world that we wish to represent for
some purpose” [5]
3. “an intensional semantic structure which encodes the implicit rules con-
straining the structure of a piece of reality” [9]
4. “a structured interpretation of a part of the world that people use to think
and communicate about the world” [3]
5. “an abstract model of some phenomenon in the world by having identi-
fied the relevant concepts of that phenomenon” [24]
Thus, in the context of the prevalent fuzzy understanding of the term “concep-
tualization”, any definition of “ontology”, which is based on it, is as barren as a
definition of “inch” based on the speed of light in the 14th century. Such a def-
inition may serve as a scholarly ornament, but it will not fulfill an explanatory
function.2
3 Towards a Fertile Definition of “Ontology”
This section enumerates a number of various phenomena that a fertile definition
of “ontology” should be able to illuminate.
3.1 Ontologies, Versions, and Sets of Formulas
According to Guarino et al. ontologies are logical theories – i.e., sets of formu-
las – that meet certain conditions [11]. Undoubtedly, ontologies involve logical
theories, but there are reasons not to simply identify an ontology with a set of
formulas. First of all, ontologies change over time and, thus, different versions
of the same ontology may be associated with different sets of formulas (e.g.,
because additional axioms have been added). Further, the same ontology may
be maintained in different languages (e.g., OWL and FOL). One cannot even
identify an ontology version with a set of formulas, because different ontology
versions may differ with respect to their annotations (e.g., if a natural language
definition of a term is added). Any explanation of “ontology” needs to address
the relationships between ontologies, their versions, and logical theories.3
2A notable attempt to address this issue and clarify “conceptualization” with the help of a
formal theory was initially proposed by Guarino in [8] and further developed in [11]. See Section 5.
3This fact was pointed out to me by Barry Smith in a conversation.
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3.2 The Importance of the Vocabulary and Annotations
From a logical point of view there is no significant difference between the
logical theories E.2a-E.2d, because for any OWL interpretation that satisfies
one of them, there are isomorphic interpretations that satisfy the others.
Example 2
E.2a Class: P DisjointWith: R
E.2b Class: Dog DisjointWith: GermanShepherd
E.2c Class: Biolgy DisjointWith: Chenistry
E.2d Class: Biology DisjointWith: Chemistry
From an ontological point of view E.2a-E.2d could not be more different.
E.2a is a logical theory, but it is not representing any knowledge about any
domain. Thus, E.2a is not an ontology. In contrast, in the absence of addi-
tional information, it is reasonable to assume that E.2b is an ontology that is
about dogs, and the ontologies E.2c and E.2d are about the relationship of two
sciences. The only difference is that E.2c contains spelling errors, while E.2d
does not.
Note that, from a logical point of view, E.2d stands in exactly the same
relationship to E.2c as to E.2b. Nevertheless, it seems obvious to us that E.2d
and E.2b are about different domains, while we assume – at least in the absence
of additional information – that E.2d and E.2c are about the same domain.
Further, we know that axiom E.2b is false, while the content of E.2c is true but
the spelling of the vocabulary needs to be fixed.
We are able to make these distinctions not because of any logical properties
of the different logical theories E.2a-E.2d, but because the choice of the vocab-
ulary is an essential component of an ontology. By using terms from a given
natural language we establish the intended interpretation of the ontology and,
indirectly, the domain that the ontology is about. If we fail to establish such an
intended interpretation as in the case of E.2a, there is no ontology.
Annotations provide another tool for establishing intended interpretations.
We use the term “annotation” in the broadest possible sense that includes any
kind of material that is included in an ontology with the intent to document
its vocabulary or its logical axioms. This may include natural language defini-
tions, explanations, comments, examples, references, links, diagrams, pictures,
audio files or video files.
Annotations are important, because the use of individual terms as part of
a vocabulary may leave room for different interpretations and ambiguity. E.g.,
the logical content of E.3a does not differ from example E.2d. However, the
annotations clarify that the term “biology” is not intended to refer to biology,
but to classes about biology. Note that the annotations in E.3a contain infor-
mation that is not captured in the axiom: the first annotation provides a label
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for the class, the second attributes the axiom to its creator, the third includes a
warning.
These examples illustrate why, typically, the axioms of an ontology reflect
only a fraction of the information that is provided by the annotations. We need
to distinguish assertive annotations from the other annotations. Assertive anno-
tations are the kind of annotations that are intended to assert a true proposition
about the domain of the ontology. E.g., adding a new label to a class does not
involve an assertion. The inclusion of metadata (e.g., authorship) is an asser-
tion, but about the ontology and not about the domain of the ontology. Thus,
the second annotation of E.3a is not an assertive annotation. The third anno-
tation is a warning. This particular warning is a speech act that involves an
assertion about the domain, namely, that for some material parental approval is
required. Hence, the last two annotations of E.3a are assertive.
The logical theory of an ontology may only represent the content of as-
sertive annotations. The third annotation of E.3a illustrates that often some
assertive annotations are not axiomatized. This may be the case for various
reasons. E.g., because the formalization would require an excessive extension
of the vocabulary or the formal language is not expressive enough. In any case,
a reductionistic view on ontologies that treats them as mere logical theories is
prone to ignore much of the information they contain.
Example 3
E.3a Class: Biology DisjointWith: Chemistry
Annotations: rdfs:label “Biology classes for middle school”, creator
Fabian,
rdfs:comment “Warning: involves material that requires parental ap-
proval”,
rdfs:comment “No biology classes are chemistry classes”
E.3b Class: P Annotations: rdfs:label “Dog” DisjointWith: R
Class: R Annotations: rdfs:label “German Shepherd”
E.3c Class: Dog DisjointWith: GermanShepherd
Annotations: rdfs:comment “German Shepherd is a popular breed of
dog”
Example E.3b illustrates that annotations are sufficient to establish an intended
interpretation, even if the vocabulary consists of arbitrary symbols. Note that
the logical theory of E.3b is identical to E.2a, but with the help of the an-
notations the theory is turned into an ontology. Indeed, one could argue that
E.3a and E.2b are ontologically equivalent, although their logical theories are
clearly not logically equivalent.
Example E.3c shows that there may be a mismatch between the logical
theory and the annotations of an ontology. It is not possible to detect this
kind of problem with the help of an OWL reasoner, since the logical theory is
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logically consistent. The problem arises because the annotation contradicts the
annotation.
The previous examples show that the choice of the vocabulary and the an-
notations play an important role, since in tandem with the logical theory they
allow the user of the ontology to establish the intended interpretation of an
ontology. By the latter we mean that the user is able to identify the domain
of the ontology and to understand the propositions that are asserted about the
domain by the annotations and the logical theory. As it is the case for any
complex texts, understanding an ontology is typically a hermeneutic process,
which leads from a very preliminary understanding of the ontology to a sit-
uation where one understands the big picture as well as all the details. The
success of such a process depends not only on the quality of the ontology, but
also on the knowledge of the user. If, for example, the vocabulary and the anno-
tations are in English, they will be of limited use to a user who does not speak
English. A good definition of “ontology” should reflect that the choice of the
vocabulary and the annotations play an important role. Further, it should en-
able an explanation of ontological equivalence and mismatch between axioms
and annotations.
3.3 Sharing an Ontology
Starting with Gruber [5], the role of ontologies for sharing knowledge featured
prominently in discussions on the nature of ontologies. Two important benefits
of an ontology are that it may be used as a knowledge resource for different
applications, and that the ontology enables different people (and systems) to
exchange information. For this reason an ontology is often defined as a spec-
ification that specifies a “shared conceptualization” (see Section 5). This is
problematic for two reasons.
Firstly, a philosophical challenge arises if one assumes that a conceptual-
ization is a kind of mental representation of a domain that is built based on
experiences. As [11] points out, under this assumption it is hard to see how
conceptualizations may be shared in the literal sense of the word. Because
mental entities are necessarily private in the sense that they are not accessible
to anyone except the person who experience them.
Secondly, the claim that ontologies are based on a shared conceptualization
contradicts the intellectual division of labor that is typical for the development
of large ontologies. Imagine that a manufacturer of cell phones develops an
ontology in order to represent knowledge about its products across their whole
life-cycles. Thus, the ontology needs to represent, for any phone, its design
(form, size, haptic features), its electronic parts and their functions, the topol-
ogy of the components, a plan of how the phone is assembled, and information
about repair and recycling. Obviously, every of these aspects is developed by
specialists. Let’s assume that the ontology development team consists of ex-
perts from the various areas. Typically, the designers of the phone have little
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knowledge about the assembly plan, while the people who are responsible for
recycling typically won’t know details about the functional specifications of the
parts. Hence, the conceptualization of the cell phone domain by any member
of the ontology development team is very detailed in the area that the person
specializes in, and shallow in other areas. Thus, the conceptualizations of the
domain of the ontology varies significantly across its developers. Therefore,
there is no single conceptualization of the domain that is shared by everybody.
Indeed, since the ontology will contain more information than any individual
team member possesses, the ontology specifies no single person’s conceptual-
ization.
While the developers of an ontology typically will possess different con-
ceptualizations of the domain, there must be some harmonization, otherwise
the development of the ontology will fail. How do we explain this?
3.4 Conceptualism vs. Realism
Ontological realists object against any definition of “ontology” as a specifi-
cation of a conceptualization because – according to them – ontologists are
not about conceptualizations but about reality [21]. This is not the place to
recapitulate the arguments in the debate between ontological realists and con-
ceptualists. However, since either position is reasonable, it seems desirable to
define “ontology” in a way that is compatible with either position and, ideally,
clarifies the exact difference between them.
4 What is an Ontology?
4.1 Ontologies are Documents
An ontology is a kind of document, like a book or a schedule of a confer-
ence. Because ontologies are documents, the same kind of systematic ambigu-
ities that apply to other documents apply to ontologies. E.g., in the sentences
“The conference schedule was fleshed out in our last planning meeting” and “I
downloaded the conference schedule” and “Youwill find a conference schedule
among your meeting materials”, the expression “conference schedule” denotes
three different entities. In the first sentence the conference schedule is an entity
that may evolve over time, the second sentence is about a particular snapshot
or version of the first entity, and the third is about particular printouts (or to-
kens) of the second entity. The same ambiguities apply to ontologies, e.g.,
consider “The Gene Ontology changed significantly since 2003. I downloaded
it yesterday, it is in my home directory on my laptop.”
These kind of systematic ambiguities are benign and we are so used to them
that we usually do not notice. But given that the goal of this paper is a clear
definition of the term “ontology”, it is worth to avoid ambiguity. Thus, for the
purpose of this paper we distinguish between documents and document ver-
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sions4. This distinction follows the United Nations System Document Ontol-
ogy (UNDO) [20], according to which a document is realized by its versions.
A particular version of a document may be derived from another version in
different ways. The UNDO distinguishes between revisions, translations, and
transformations.
The distinctions for documents in general also apply to ontologies. An on-
tology version is a realization of an ontology. An ontology version may be
derived from a previous version in various ways, e.g., by adding new axioms,
removing annotations, or correcting spelling mistakes. Further, an ontology
version may be the result of translating the annotations in a different language
(e.g., from English to Spanish) or by translating the logical theory from one
logic to another (e.g., from OWL to first-order logic) or by changing the seri-
alization of the logical theory (e.g., from a serialization in OWL Manchester
Syntax to Turtle). Thus, ontology versions do not exist in isolation, but form a
network. This network can be thought of as a directed acyclic graph where the
edges represent the derives-from-relationship. This leads us to Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Ontology) An ontology of a domain is a document that is real-
ized by a network of ontology versions about the domain.
Of course, this definition only pushes our original question one step further and
we need to ask ourselves: What is an ontology version about a domain?
4.2 Ontology versions
As we have seen in Section 3.2, an ontology version involves three elements: a
vocabulary, annotations, and a logical theory in some logic; and the vocabulary
and the annotations play an important role in establishing the intended interpre-
tation of an ontology. For anyone who attempts to analyze these observations
closer, one challenge is that one has to avoid too specific assumptions about the
entities involved. The vocabulary most likely consists of strings, but even that
is not necessarily the case. As discussed above, annotations come in a wide
variety of forms, some of them are assertive and some are not. And since on-
tologies are written in various logical formalisms, we cannot make any strong
assumptions about the logic either. Most importantly, one needs to address the
nature of the rather mystical ‘intended interpretation’.
Let’s start with the basics. By a domain of interest D we understand a
topic that one or more people may be interested in. Examples include quantum
physics, FC Liverpool, cardinal numbers, and Game of Thrones.
By propositionswe understand the semantic contents of assertive sentences.
Propositions may be true or false, and they are subjects of beliefs. It seems
plausible to assume that the proposition that is asserted by a complex sentence
like “John is bald and Fred is tall” is structured in some way and is connected
4Both are distinguished from document tokens (e.g., particular files on a hard drive or particular
printouts). Document tokens are not relevant for the purpose of this paper.
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in some interesting fashion to the proposition that is asserted by “John is bald”.
However, within the context of this paper we abstract from the internal struc-
ture of propositions and do not worry about how they relate to each other. The
only exception is that we assume that any set of propositions is either consis-
tent or inconsistent. Two sets of propositions P1,P2 are weakly equivalent iff,
for any set of propositions P3, P1∪P3 is inconsistent iff P1∪P3 is inconsistent.
For any given domain D, PD is the set of propositions that is about D. Assume
P† ⊆ PD. A consistent set of propositions P⊆ PD is a maximal consistent sub-
set of P† iff there is no consistent set of propositions P′ such that P ⊂ P′ and
P′ ⊆ P†.
Since we do not want to consider a particular logic for our purpose, we
define a logic as an entailment system.5
Definition 2 (Logic) A logic L= 〈Sym,Sen,sign,⊢〉 consists of
1. the set of symbols Sym;
2. the set of sentences Sen over Sym;
3. the function sign :℘(Sen)→℘(Sym) that maps a set of sentences to its
signature (i.e., the set of symbols that occur in it), such that
(a) sign( /0) = /0 and sign(Sen) = Sym;
(b) if Γ ⊆ ∆ ⊆ Sen, then sign(Γ)⊆ sign(∆);
4. an entailment relationship ⊢ ⊆ ℘(Sen)×Sen .
Based on our definition of a logic, we may introduce the notion of an an-
notated logical theory. For any logic L = 〈Sym,Sen,sign,⊢〉, Γ is a theory in
L iff Γ ⊆ Sen; Γ is a theory over V in L iff V⊆ Sym and Γ is a theory in L and
sign(Γ)⊆ V.
Definition 3 (Annotated Logical Theory) An annotated logical theory 〈V,Γ,
Anno,L〉 consists of
1. a non-empty set of symbols V (the vocabulary);
2. a theory Γ over V in L;
3. a set Anno of annotations, which is partitioned into the set of assertive
annotations Annoa and non-assertive annotations Annon;
4. a logic L.
Given a set of assertive statements about a domain, their intended interpre-
tation may be considered as a mapping from these syntactic entities to propo-
sitions about the domain. In the case of the ontology these assertive statements
come in two flavors: the assertive annotations and the axioms of the ontology.
5As [2] points out, in order to include formalisms like linear logic, one would have to use
multisets instead of sets. Def. 2 is richer than the corresponding definition in [2], since the cho-
sen vocabulary is important for ontologies. One other difference is that Def. 2 allows the set of
premises to be infinite.
10
Definition 4 Let Λ = 〈V,Γ,Anno,L〉 be an annotated logical theory and let D
be a domain. An intended interpretation I from Λ into D is a mapping such
that: (1) for any annotation a ∈ Annoa, I(a) ∈ PD; and (2) for any sentence
φ ∈ Γ, I(φ) ∈ PD.
As we have discussed in Section 4.1, an ontology version is a kind of docu-
ment version. Now, we can bemore specific: the authors of an ontology version
specify an annotated theory in such a way that the users are able to grasp its
intended interpretation (see Definition 5). This usually involves the use of an
established terminology for the domain either as the vocabulary or as labels
for the vocabulary. Note that the ontology version does not necessarily need
to contain the complete vocabulary, axioms, and annotations of the annotated
logical theory, since the ontology version may contain importations.
Definition 5 (Ontology Version) Let D be a domain.
o is an ontology version about D iff o is a document version that specifies
exactly one annotated logical theoryΛ= 〈V,Γ,Anno,L〉 such that the choice of
the the vocabularyV together with the annotations inAnno and the axioms in Γ
enable a competent user of the ontology to ascertain the intended interpretation
function I from Λ into D.
Let Po be the set of propositions asserted by o, where Po = Po
Anno
∪ PoΓ and
Po
Anno
= { p∈PD | p= I(a),a∈Anno
a} and PoΓ = { p∈PD | p= I(φ) and Γ ⊢
φ}.
In Definition 5 Po
Anno
is the set of propositions that are the intended interpreta-
tions of the assertive annotations of the ontology o. Analogously, PoΓ is the set
of propositions that are intended interpretations of formulas that are entailed
by Γ. Definition 5 allows us to define various notions. Let o1,o2 be ontolo-
gies about a domain D. o1,o2 are strongly equivalent iff P
o1 = Po2 . o1,o2 are
weakly equivalent iff Po1 and Po2 are weakly equivalent. o1 is stronger than
o2 iff there is some P
′ ⊆ PD such that P
o1 and Po2 ∪P′ are weakly equivalent.
o contains a mismatch between the logical theory and the annotations iff Po
Anno
and PoΓ each are consistent, but P
o
Anno
∪PoΓ is inconsistent.
These definitions allows us to explain the examples E.2 and E.3. E.2a is not
an ontology version, since it does fail to establish an intended interpretation.
The intended interpretations of E.2b and E.2d map their axioms to different
propositions. In contrast, E.2c and E.2d are mapped to the same proposition,
and, thus, they are strongly ontologically equivalent. In contrast to E.2a, the
annotations in E.3b specify the intended interpretation. E.3b and E.2b are on-
tologically strongly equivalent. E.3c contains a mismatch between its annota-
tions and its logical theory.
Definition 5 does not assume that the whole document is written in some
formal language. We do not include this requirement, since there are well-
known publications of ontologies that do not meet it. E.g., in [15] DOLCE is
specified in a PDF document that contains free text and axioms. Of course, the
axioms are written in a formal language, but the overall document is not.
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According to Definition 5 an ontology is basically an annotated logical
theory which is interpreted as propositions about a domain. These propositions
do not need to be true or correspond to a conceptualization. Thus, even an
ontology that contains only false axioms is an ontology. How ontologies relate
to conceptualizations or reality will be discussed next.
4.3 Ontologies from a Realists’ Perspective
According to ontological realism, an ontology is about a particular slice of
reality (on a given level of granularity viewed from a particular perspective)
[21]. Let’s call a domain of interest that meets that description a real domain.
The anatomy of zebrafish and the political structure of Iran are examples for
real domains. In contrast, the anatomy of unicorns or the political structure of
the Seven Kingdoms in the Game of Thrones world are not real domains. Thus,
from a realist’s perspective these topics are no suitable domains of interest for
an ontology. This is a major difference to the conceptualist’s position, whose
domain of interest may involve fictional entities.
One way to characterize a realistic domain is by the different states of affair
that may come about in this domain. A state of affair may be formally repre-
sented by maximal consistent sets of propositions about the domain. Thus,
for the purpose of this paper (admittedly, a strong simplification) we assume
the following: A real domain D is a set of maximal consistent subsets of PD.
Based on this definition, we may define when an ontology of a real domain is
correct:
Definition 6 (Correct Ontology) A document o is a correct ontology version
of a real domain D iff o is an ontology version about D and for any state of
affair s ∈D: Po ⊆ s.
4.4 Ontologies from a Conceptualist’s Perspective
According to ontological conceptualism, ontologies specify conceptualizations
(of some domain). As discussed in Section 2, the nature of conceptualizations
is unclear. However, we will make the following assumption about conceptu-
alizations: if an agent internalizes a conceptualization C of a given domain D,
then the conceptualization enables the agent when presented a given state of
affairs s to evaluate for a given proposition p ∈ PD whether (a) p is true in s
according to C or (b) p is false in s according to C or (c) whether the truth-
value of p in s is not determined by C. This assumption allows us to avoid the
thorny question of the nature of conceptualizations. Instead we treat them as
black boxes that are characterized by the ability of an agent who internalizes
the conceptualization to answer questions (or show some other behavior that
allows us to infer how the agent evaluates propositions). Since this is a kind
of behavioristic turn, we call this characterization the behavioral profile of a
conceptualization (BPC) of a given domain. Such a BPC consists of the set of
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states of affair in the domain that the conceptualization is about and provides
for each state of affair a partial mapping from propositions to true or false. The
mapping is partial, since we allow incomplete conceptualizations of a domain.
Definition 7 (Behavioral Profile of a Conceptualization (BPC)) A BPC of a
domain D is an ordered pair 〈S,v〉 where
1. the set of states of affair S is non-empty;
2. the valuation function v assigns a partial function vs :PD→{true, false},
to each state of affair s ∈ S.
Assumption 1 For any conceptualizationC of a domainD there exists exactly
one BPC C of D that characterizes the ability of an agent that internalizes C
to evaluate propositions about D.
Based on this assumption, we could define a ontology version to be a correct
specification of a given conceptualization if the asserted propositions are true
under any state of affair that is part of the conceptualization. However, as we
have discussed in Section 3, the development of ontologies typically involves
a number of people with varying conceptualizations. For this reason, we gen-
eralize the notion as follows: an ontology version is a correct specification of a
set of conceptualizations, if it is consistent with each individual conceptualiza-
tion and every proposition that is asserted by the ontology is true according to
at least one conceptualization (see Def. 8). An ontology version may contain
bugs. Thus, not every specification by an ontology version is correct. Nev-
ertheless, the ontology version is still a specification of the conceptualizations
(see Def. 9).
Definition 8 (Correct Specification of Conceptualizations) Let D be a do-
main, C a conceptualization of D such that C = 〈S,v〉, C = {C1, . . . ,Cn} a
set of conceptualizations of D, such that for any Ci ∈ C the corresponding
BPC Ci = 〈Si,vi〉, and o an ontology version about D.
o is consistent with C iff o is an ontology version about D and for any state of
affair s ∈ S: vs(p) 6= false, for any p ∈ P
o.
o is a correct specification of C iff o is an ontology version about D and
1. o is consistent with Ci, for any Ci ∈ C;
2. for any p ∈ Po, there is a Ci ∈ C, such that for all s ∈ Si, vs(p) = true.
Definition 9 (Specification of Conceptualizations) An ontology version o spec-
ifies the conceptualizations C iff the authors of o intend o to be a correct spec-
ification of C.
Definitions 8 and 9 explain why a division of intellectual labor does not prevent
ontology development, because it is possible for people to develop an ontology
together, even if they do not share the same conceptualization of the domain.
The different ontology developers may even possess conceptualizations of the
domain that contradict each other, as long as the ontology is non-committal
concerning the contested propositions.
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4.5 Conceptualism vs. Realism
While the conceptualist raises the question whether an ontology accurately rep-
resents our conceptualizations of a given domain, the realist is mainly con-
cerned with the question whether an ontology represents reality accurately.
Both questions are quite reasonable and related. We call a conceptualization
of a real domain correct, if in all situations that are considered by the con-
ceptualization, the valuation function in that situation does not conflict with
reality (see Def. 10). One can prove that a correct specification of a correct
conceptualization, is a correct ontology of the domain (Theorem 1).
Definition 10 (Correct conceptualization) Let D be a real domain, C be a
conceptualization of D, and let C= 〈S,v〉.
C is a correct conceptualization of D iff (1) S ⊆ D and (2) for any state of
affair s ∈ S and any proposition p ∈ PD:
(a) if vs(p) = true, then p ∈ s;
(b) if vs(p) = false, then p 6∈ s.
Theorem 1 If C is a set of correct conceptualizations of the real domainD and
o is a correct specification of C, then o is a correct ontology version of D.
5 Related Work
In the context of information systems “ontology” was first used in 1967 by
Mealy [17].6 However, arguably more significant is Some Philosophical Prob-
lems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence [16] from 1969, in which
McCarthy and Hayes argue that general intelligent machines require meta-
physically and epistemologically adequate representations of the world, and
propose the situation calculus as a representation language. Although the term
is not used in [16], today we would call these representations ‘ontologies’. The
vision presented in [16] lead to Hayes’ work on naive physics, in particular
his 1978 paper “Naive Physics I: Ontology for Liquids” [12], which seems to
be the first computer science paper with “ontology” in the title. [12] does not
contain an explicit definition of “ontology”, but the first sentence states that the
essay contains “[...] a formalisation of common-sense knowledge [...]”.
Thus, the term “ontology” was already established in computer science,
when in 1992 Tom Gruber proposed the definition “An ontology is a specifica-
tion of a conceptualization” [4]. Shortly afterward Gruber added the condition
that the specification is explicit [5, 6], Borst [3] added the conditions that the
specification needs to be formal and the conceptualization needs to be shared.
Studer [24] combined these and defines an ontology as a formal, explicit spec-
ification of a shared conceptualization.
6 For the sake of brevity, we limit our discussion of the history of the term “ontology” and, in
particular, omit its history in philosophy. A more detailed account can be found in [22].
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All of the modifications of Gruber’s initial definition are dubious. In [5]
it is quite clear that Gruber borrows the term “specification” from the formal
software specification community, which uses formalisms like “Z” to describe
software systems. In [5] KIF is used as specification language. Thus, any speci-
fication in the sense of Gruber is formal. Further, since it is unclear what an im-
plicit KIF document would look like, the explicity condition seems redundant
as well.7 Borst argues for including the shared-conceptualization-condition,
because “[...] the ability to reuse an ontology will be almost nil when the con-
ceptualization it specifies is not generally accepted.” [3]. The argument seems
to be based on the underlying assumption that a shared conceptualization is a
precondition for shared use or reuse. As we have argued in Sections 3.3 and
4.4, an ontology may represent knowledge from people whose conceptualiza-
tion of the domain differs.
Guarino argues that the term “specification” is too strong and suggests to
weaken the definition to “logical theory which gives an explicit, partial account
of a conceptualization” [10]. Smith and Welty argue that Gruber’s definition
is too wide, since it encompasses a diverse group of artifacts ranging from
catalogs, over glossaries to a set of logical constraints. [23]
One notable exception to our criticism of conceptualization-based defini-
tions of ontology is the seminal work by Guarino et al. in [11], which builds
on [10, 8]. It presents a definition of “ontology” based on a formal theory of
conceptualizations. In short, [11] identifies an ontology with a set of formu-
las whose models approximate a conceptualization, which is identified with
an intensional first-order relational structure. Since [11] identifies ontologies
with sets of formulas, it does not explain the ability of ontologies to change,
and fails to address the role of the choice of the vocabulary and the annotations.
Further, it also assumes that ontologies are based on shared conceptualizations,
which fails to account for the division of labor during ontology development.
Two other problematic aspects are the lack of explanation of what “approxi-
mates” is supposed to mean, and the identification of conceptualizations with
intensional first-order structures that lead to several technical and philosophical
issues. A detailed critique of [11] may be found in [18].
6 Conclusion
In this paper we presented an alternative definition of “ontology”. It is based
on a formal theory that involves two key notions: an annotated logical theory
and an intended interpretation. The definition does not make any assumptions
about the logical language of the ontology or the type of annotations that are
used. Further, it is not only compatible with both conceptualism and realism,
but allows showing that a correct specification of correct conceptualizations
is a correct ontology (version). The fruitfulness of the definition is further
7Unfortunately, in [5, 6] Gruber does not discuss why he added the explicity condition.
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illustrated by an explanation of the role of the choice of the vocabulary and
annotations for establishing an intended interpretation, and an account of how
cooperative ontology development is possible without a shared conceptualiza-
tion.
In the future we are planning to study the approach’s consequences for on-
tology evaluation (completeness of axioms, underaxiomatization, lack of docu-
mentation). Further, we are planning to instantiate it for particular logics (e.g.,
FOL), which will enable us to relate the formal semantics of the logic to the
intended interpretations.
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